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STATEMENT OF

RAY J. GROVES, CHAIRMAN

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Before the

Committee on the Judiciary
of the
United States Senate

July 31, 1985

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am Ray J.

Groves, Chairman of the American Institute of Certified
Accompanying me are Philip B. Chenok,

Public Accountants.

President of the Institute, Theodore C. Barreaux, the AICPA

Vice President in charge of our Washington office, and AICPA
Special Counsel Philip A. Lacovara of Hughes Hubbard & Reed.

The AICPA is the national professional organization
of certified public accountants (CPAs) in the United States.
Its service to the profession and to the public spans almost
one hundred years.

Today, membership consists of over

230,000 CPAs in public practice, in industry, in education
and in government.

The Institute is widely recognized as the

authoritative voice of the accounting profession.
Mr. Chairman, as you noted in a recent speech,
Congress from time to time encounters a need to reexamine a

statute to ensure that it is being implemented according to

Congressional intent.

You went on to note that the private

civil RICO provisions have been interpreted and applied in
ways which necessitate further Congressional scrutiny.

Speaking through the Vice President's Task Group on Financial
Services, the Reagan Administration has recognized that the

civil RICO statute is being abused and needs to be reformed.
Attorney General Meese, in response to a question posed at

hearings before this Committee in April, stated that the
Justice Department had been analyzing the use of this statute
by private parties and "may be coming before the Congress
with some legislation to modify the statute."

The need to reexamine civil RICO has gained greater

urgency just in the last month, when the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the courts do not have the power to

cure the abuse of civil RICO by private parties by narrowly
interpreting its open-ended language.

The Court unanimously

agreed that civil RICO had come to be used in a manner not

envisioned by Congress, but a bare majority of the Court held
that whatever defect in the language of RICO leads to this
misuse is, aS the majority opinion put it, "inherent in the

statute as written, and its correction must lie with Con
gress."

We commend this Committee for undertaking this
significant review of the civil RICO provisions.

We can

think of no case which so perfectly fits your standard for
revisiting a statute to determine if its use conforms with

Congressional intent.

At the outset, the AICPA would like to state

clearly and without equivocation that we are not in favor of
weakening the criminal sanctions directed against organized

crime as contained in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
or as it was amended in 1984.

To the contrary, we would

enthusiastically support enhanced sanctions against such
insidious activities.

Moreover, we fully support properly

constructed civil remedies against organized crime, including

the application of civil RICO provisions.

But the AICPA does

call for Congressional action to redirect the RICO statute to

its intended purpose of attacking organized crime.

The bill from which the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970 (including the RICO title) was derived originated in
the Senate and contained no private civil RICO provision when

introduced or when initially passed by the Senate.

The

object of the legislation was to enhance the federal govern

ment's arsenal in the war against organized crime, not to
create new remedies for commercial disputes.

This Commit

tee's Report on the bill clearly stated the bill's precise

purposes:

"The eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence gathering process, by establishing new
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime."
S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969).
In this vein, Senator McClellan, the chief sponsor,

focused his arguments for the bill on the activities of "La
Cosa Nostra.”

In particular, he was concerned that when

"organized crime moves into a business, it usually brings to
that venture all the techniques of violence and intimidation

which is used in its illegal business.”

(1969).

115 Cong. Rec. 5872

There was concern, however, that any attempt to

define ”organized crime” per se in the statute — as Senator

McClellan had attempted to do in earlier legislation intro
duced in the 90th Congress — would encounter constitutional

difficulties.

Accordingly, Senator McClellan instead

endorsed an approach that would create a broad list of
predicate offenses, including various types of fraud, because

organized crime had shown great flexibility in branching into

additional illegal activities and "if we name one crime they
will commit another."

Congress, the Senator explained, could

not "anticipate everything;" it would "have to make a statute

general."

116 Cong. Rec. 845-846 (1970).

Under this approach, the Department of Justice,
which was to have exclusive authority to enforce this
criminal statute, would thus have the power and the responsi
bility to channel the statute against its intended target:
organized crime.

Significantly, when this Committee

broadened the statute to include mail fraud, wire fraud, and
securities fraud as predicates that could give rise to RICO

prosecution, the bill still provided for enforcement solely

in cases prosecuted by the Justice Department.
These broad provisions, therefore, could not have
been intended to expose legitimate businessmen to massive
private suits, since the Senate bill did not even authorize

private suits.

With little discussion, however, the House

Judiciary Committee later added the private civil remedy,

including its provision for treble damages and attorney's
fees.

No one involved in proposing that amendment, however,

suggested that it was to revolutionize federal law applicable
to business or securities transactions or was to federalize
local commercial disputes.

Vividly illustrating the view

that this addition did not alter the essential nature of the

bill, the Committee's report devoted only a single, bland

sentence to the new provision:

"The title, as amended, also authorizes civil
treble damage suits on the part of private parties
who are injured." H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 58 (1970).
In the House debates that led to passage of the
bill as reported, the Members gave scant attention to this

aspect of the bill.

Instead, the debate was dominated by

controversy over the breadth of the enforcement powers being

conferred upon the government, not only in the RICO title but
See generally 116 Cong. Rec.

in other provisions as well.

35,191-217, 35,287-363 (1970).

The House, too, in evaluating

the RICO provisions, was mainly concerned with the infiltra

tion of organized crime figures into businesses across the

nation.

Thus, Congressman Poff, a leading proponent of the

legislation, pointed to the takeover of a jukebox business by

"a mafia boss" as an illustration of the general understand
ing that RICO was meant to prevent organized crime from
injuring legitimate business people.

116 Cong. Rec. 6709

(1970).
Since the amended bill returned to the Senate near

the adjournment of the Congress, the Senate accepted it

without a conference.

This chamber did so, however, without

any suggestion that the focus of Congressional concern had

shifted in the slightest from the goal of punishing hard-core

criminals through federal prosecution.

Indeed, Senator

McClellan described the House amendments, including the
addition of the provision for private civil suits, as
relatively "minor changes."

116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970).

At no time did any supporter of the RICO bill ever suggest

that the private civil remedy was intended for use against
legitimate business people, corporations, and licensed
professional partnerships, or was to be used in commercial

disputes having nothing whatsoever to do with the activities
of what was and is commonly understood as "organized crime."

In fact, though, that is precisely how civil RICO
is being used.

The insertion of a broad private right of

action into the sweeping, Senate-passed organized crime bill
allowed any victim of a pattern of so-called "racketeering

activity” to sue in federal court and recover treble damages,
plus attorney's fees.

With increasing frequency, this

seemingly meritorious device for redressing the injuries

inflicted by organized crime has been turned against ordinary
businesses — the very people the act intended to protect.

Among those who have found themselves targeted by "racketeer
ing" allegations — and please remember it only needs to be

alleged that criminal violations have occurred — have been
this Nation's leading and most respected accounting firms,

banks, insurance companies, securities firms, and many other

legitimate business people.
This Committee is well aware of the structure of a

RICO claim, and it would serve no useful purpose to detail
all of its elements.

To explain how civil RICO has come to

be so distorted and abused, I should merely note that the
commission of any two proscribed acts within a ten year

period may trigger the statute and the availability of the

treble damage claim.

Some of these so-called "predicate"

offenses are those of a hard-core nature often associated

murder, kidnapping, extortion and

with organized crime:

arson.

But also included are some offenses subject to broad

interpretation, such as mail fraud, wire fraud, and fraud in
the sale of securities.

Allegations of fraud can be easily framed in almost

any business transaction gone awry.
has happened in the RICO arena.

And this is exactly what

The statute is now being

invoked in every kind of litigation where a disgruntled

investor, purchaser, or business associate can possibly
allege that another party to the transaction did not deal

fairly with him.

Under the criminal mail and wire fraud

test, this kind of allegation appears to be sufficient to
constitute "fraud”.

In fact, the use of civil RICO becomes

more ludicrous every day, encompassing breach of contract

actions, commonplace landlord-tenant or real estate disputes,
product liability actions, wrongful discharge from employment

cases, matrimonial controversies, political squabbles, and

even religious disputes.

The result has been, as Justice Marshall wrote for

four members of the Court in the recent Sedima decision —
and the other five Justices did not dispute this point — to

"quite simply revolutionize[] private litigation."

Civil

RICO has disrupted the system of civil litigation in two
major respects.

First, it has federalized large portions of

law traditionally reserved to adjudication in the state

courts under state law.

Second, it allows plaintiffs to

bypass carefully structured systems of rights and remedies in
such areas of federal law as securities regulation; plain
tiffs can do this simply by converting a securities law claim

into a RICO claim based on two instances of mail or wire
fraud.

Moreover, the mere allegation of racketeering
activity under the statute is damaging.

Few professionals or

businesses dependent on maintaining a reputation for integ
rity dare risk the harm that may result from this type of

publicity, even if confident that the litigation would prove
unsuccessful.

As Justice Marshall explained in Sedima:

"[M]any a prudent defendant, facing ruinous
exposure, will decide to settle even a case with no
merit.
It is thus not surprising that civil RICO
has been used for extortive purposes, giving rise
to the very evils it was designed to combat."
According to comprehensive data recently collected

on hundreds of civil RICO cases by the American Bar Associa
tion’s Special RICO Task Force, 91% of all civil RICO cases

rely primarily or solely on the securities, wire or mail
fraud predicates of this organized crime statute.

Only 9% of

all civil RICO cases involve underlying allegations of

criminal activity of the type generally associated with

professional criminals.

The statute thus has become primar

ily a tool for civil litigants to avoid the carefully crafted
limitations of the federal securities laws and to federalize

a wide variety of local commercial disputes.

In his testimony before this Committee in May

addressing the need for civil reform, Assistant Attorney

General Trott of the Department of Justice reported that the

Department's own survey of private RICO cases confirmed this
pattern of massive abuse.

He estimated that, as a result of

the increasing use of civil RICO in commercial disputes, the
actual number of private cases filed already exceeds 500.

According to the Justice Department's calculations, only
about 7% of these cases involve either actual organized crime
figures or the kinds of criminal conduct common to organized

crime syndicates.

As Assistant Attorney General Trott

concluded:
"Experience has shown . . . that the instances of
private civil RICO's use against traditional
organized crime activities are far outweighed by
example of its application as a general federal
anti-fraud remedy against seemingly reputable
businessmen.”

Relying on surveys of this type, the Supreme Court
accurately remarked in the recent Sedima decision, "in its

private civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite
different from the original conception of its enactors" and

that these suits are "being brought almost solely against"
what it called "respected businesses” rather than against

"the archetypal, intimidating mobster."

In the wake of the

Supreme Court's recent decisions in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex

Co. and American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, the
invocation of RICO against what Assistant Attorney General

Trott called "conduct bearing little resemblance to organized

crime activity in the traditional sense" is almost certain to

accelerate.

To eliminate the well-documented and widely

recognized abuses of civil RICO and to refocus the statute on
its intended targets, Congress should permit civil claims

under RICO to proceed only after the defendant has been
convicted of a RICO offense or of at least one of the
predicate offenses.

Under the kind of amendment that we

urge, a plaintiff bringing a private treble damage action
under this special "organized crime" statute should have to

prove that:

(1)

the defendant violated the provisions of
RICO by engaging in conduct that violated
18 U.S.C. S 1962, as is currently
required;

(2)

the defendant has been convicted either
of a RICO violation or of one of the
predicate acts based on the conduct upon
which the plaintiff bases his civil RICO
claim, a new provision;

(3)

the plaintiff has been injured by the
defendant's violation of Section 1962, as
the statute presently requires; and

(4)

the civil claim is filed within one year
of the latest pertinent criminal convic
tion, a new provision.

Such an amendment would confine the situations in
which suits can be filed to those in which public prosecutors

have screened those people who may fairly be charged with

being involved in real criminal activity from those who
should not be subject to accusations of "racketeering."

I

emphasize that, if Congress enacts this kind of amendment,-

persons allegedly injured by conduct that has not lead to

criminal prosecution and conviction would still have avail

able all the other federal and state law remedies that apply
to commercial disputes and alleged torts.

The prior-

criminal-conviction requirement would be the most direct and

precise way to return RICO to its intended use as a weapon
against career criminals, and its abuse as a weapon in
ordinary commercial litigation would end.
I am aware that people who are eager to preserve
the potent leverage that civil RICO gives them in commercial

litigation have repeatedly recited a laundry list of socalled problems with a prior-criminal-conviction requirement

Through repetition — and because to date these claims have

generally gone unanswered -- these assertions have taken on
more credence than they deserve.

When those so-called

problems are examined, however, each evaporates.

I do not

have the time to go through those objections one by one and
explain why they do not carry much weight, but we have done
so in our more detailed memorandum on the subject of civil

RICO that I am submitting as an Appendix to my statement and
I ask that it be included in the record.

That memorandum

puts to rest the notion that a prior-criminal-conviction

requirement would create any insurmountable difficulties or
any greater problems than those that accompany any change in
the law.

In examining the so-called problems created by a

prior-criminal-conviction requirement, the Committee should

of course not lose sight of the tremendous problems that

would result from a failure to act:

the growing use of civil

RICO to revolutionize ordinary commercial litigation.
The need for reform is clear.

Congress should move

promptly to amend the civil provisions of RICO to restore the
private remedy to its original purpose as an additional
weapon against organized crime, while curing its current

capacity to inflict harm and unreasonable costs on legitimate

businesses.

